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The 2009 Lisbon Treaty sought to enhance the coherence of EU foreign policies by improving 
the conditions for collective action in the EU-level foreign relations system, including its 
interaction with member states. Several innovations aimed to facilitate collective action: the 
establishment of the European External Action Service, bringing EU institutions and member 
state officials together, is the most important. Policy-level innovations, in turn, have included 
a string of ‘comprehensive’, ‘joined-up’, and ‘whole-of-government’ approaches that have 
explicitly focussed on linking the various instruments in the EU’s tool box. Have these 
reforms led to improved policy coherence? We focus on a key domain that illustrates 
Europe’s engagement with the changing global context: the nexus of security and 
development policy. Drawing on post-Lisbon Treaty policy documents and interviews with 
officials from the EU foreign relations bureaucracy, we argue that collective action at the 
EU-level has improved somewhat since 2010. This has been accompanied by some 
improvements in the coherence of security and development policy. Nevertheless, decision-
making is still affected by bureaucratic actors catering to specific constituencies and, 
accordingly, the coherence of security and development policies remains challenged. The EU 
institutions lack the strategic direction that would be provided by clear prioritisation of 
global policy objectives, but this is not possible in a system that lacks clear hierarchy. 
Without combining strategic direction with effective changes in the foreign relations 
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I. Introduction 
 
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty introduced profound changes to EU foreign relations,2 a governance 
system that not only involves a vast number of cross-cutting policies but also institutional 
actors from the EU as well as 28 member states. In light of this ‘multi-level actorness’, it is no 
surprise that the scope and conduct of EU foreign relations are constrained by challenges of 
collective action. In contrast to previous attempts to improve collective action between the 
various components of the foreign relations machinery, the Lisbon Treaty forged entirely new 
bodies with the objective of bridging the intergovernmental and supranational realms of EU 
foreign policymaking. By combining the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) and External Relations Commissioner in the new post of High 
Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP), by establishing the European 
External Action Service (EEAS), by reforming the European Commission directorates general 
(DGs) responsible for development and neighbourhood policy, by enhancing the European 
Parliament’s oversight role, and by reforming the EU delegations, the Lisbon Treaty aimed at 
drawing the policymaking systems for foreign and security policy, development, 
neighbourhood and humanitarian response much closer together. 
 
Concomitantly, the Lisbon Treaty changes reignited the debate on how to turn the EU into a 
more integrated and comprehensive actor on the global stage. Underlying the strategy of 
institutional reform at the EU level was the assumption that improving collective action 
among actors with differentiated but complementary mandates, and creating new actors with 
multiple policy responsibilities, should also improve policy coherence. The intended outcome 
was not just a better functioning bureaucratic system at the EU-level, but also improved 
‘consistency between the different areas of EU external action’ (HR/VP 2013: 2). Many 
observers echoed Simon Duke’s expectation that the EU would eventually become ‘a more 
coherent actor on the global stage’ (Duke 2008: 1; Holland and Doidge 2012: 123, M.E. 
Smith 2013).  
 
But does improving collective action lead to greater policy coherence? This article discusses 
this question with reference to the effects that the post-Lisbon treaty reforms have had on how 
the EU handles the security-development nexus, where policymaking requires cooperation 
among actors with differing mandates, constituencies and capabilities. Existing accounts in 
the growing body of literature on policy coherence in EU external relations have sketched out 
normative expectations for policy coherence (Egenhofer et al 2006, Sianes 2013). We attempt 
to take this a step further based on empirical evidence, as called for by researchers (Zwolski 
2012: 1002) and the EU foreign affairs council itself (European Council 2012). Five years 
after the inception of the Lisbon Treaty, we can begin to assess whether the innovations have 
triggered tangible results. 
Considerations of policy coherence can, nevertheless, never avoid normative considerations 
entirely. Policy coherence concerns the externalities that decisions in one policy area have for 
the intended outcomes of policy decisions in other policy areas (Nilsson et al 2012). 
‘Coherence’ can, therefore, never be an abstract value existing in isolation from normative 
preferences for given outcomes. Policy coherence for development (PCD) is a long-running 
debate in the EU external relations context, both at the policy level in the several reports the 
European Commission has published, and in scholarly literature discussing the impacts of in 
2 Even the simple task of labelling what the EU does outside its borders is beset by coherence problems. We use 
the term ‘foreign relations’ to encompass ‘external relations’ (the activities of the European Commission outside 
the borders of the EU), ‘foreign policy’ (the CFSP), ‘security policy’ (the CSDP) and specific ‘external’ policy 
areas such as development, trade, neighbourhood and humanitarian affairs, which are managed by the 
responsible Commission directorates-general, often in cooperation with the EEAS and the EU delegations. 
                                                        
particular agriculture and trade policies on the outcomes of EU aid programmes (Carbone 
2008, Young and Peterson 2013). From a collective action perspective, the defining feature of 
PCD is the identification of trade-offs and synergies across interacting policy domains that 
can contribute to achieving development objectives that cannot be realised solely with 
development aid (Picciotto 2005). This implies that policy coherence is best served when the 
actors responsible for policymaking in various domains engage in a process of designing and 
implementing comprehensive policy frameworks with strategic objectives in mind, and that 
both the objectives themselves and the processes by which they are pursued support rather 
than undermine each other.  
 
We argue that improving collective action through institutional and bureaucratic reform 
cannot improve policy coherence in the absence of clear strategic direction. This is because 
strategic direction is necessary for enabling bureaucratic actors to prioritise, and thereby to 
organise themselves institutionally and allocate resources accordingly. However, strategic 
direction is in itself a collective action challenge in that it requires leadership and trade-offs 
among competing policy objectives. The Barroso II Commission, which oversaw the Lisbon 
Treaty’s implementation between 2010 and 2014, was not able to provide strategic direction 
for reasons discussed below, but nevertheless prioritised collective action and laid important 
foundations for improving coherence. The Juncker Commission, which took office in late 
2014, has taken further steps towards improved collective action and policy coherence, in 
particular through the EU strategic review process (EEAS 2015). To this end, the June 2015 
European Council encouraged a ‘process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an 
EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with member states 
(European Council 2015: 6). 
 
The rest of the article is organised as follows: the next section discusses the relationship 
between collective action and coherence at the level of actors and polices from a theoretical 
perspective. The third section details the main reforms aimed at improving collective action in 
EU foreign relations introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The fourth section turns to the impact 
of these reforms on collective action and coherence with regard to EU policy at the security-
development nexus. The final section concludes with some analytical and policy implications 
for EU foreign relations and policy coherence for development. 
 
 
II. Collective action and policy coherence 
 
Policy coherence in EU foreign relations has been widely debated by scholars asking what 
kind of international actor the EU is (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; Grimm, Gänzle and 
Makhan 2012). Some scholars have argued that the idea of ‘normative power Europe’ is in 
fact a smokescreen for old-fashioned realpolitik (Hyde-Price 2006). Others have noted that 
the EU’s responses to complex regional and global processes are driven by a range of material 
and normative factors that require alternative analytical explanations or narratives (Youngs 
2014). Ultimately, questions about whether the EU’s foreign relations are primarily anchored 
in norm-based policies such as human rights and democracy promotion or whether its motives 
are primarily geo-strategic or economic are coherence debates (Kreutz 2015). In the EU, 
incoherence is magnified by the complexity of the multilevel system and the plethora of 
constituencies and diverging interests which are represented (Carbone 2008). Consequently, 
policy incoherence is often the outcome of unresolved or partially-resolved collective action 
problems (Gebhardt 2011).3  
 
Conceptually, the link between collective action and policy coherence is related to the public 
goods challenge of how the costs and benefits of policies are dispersed and concentrated. It is 
well known that when the benefits of a policy change are large and concentrated among a 
group of actors, the group has a strong incentive for acting collectively. On the other hand, 
when diffuse interests pull in different directions, incentives to act collectively are lower 
(Blouin 2007). The relationship between collective action and coherence is mutually 
reinforcing: when actors prefer different policy outcomes they are less likely to act 
collectively than when they prefer similar outcomes, and vice-versa. When the policy change 
in question is one that is expected to lead to more coherence between two or more policy 
areas, actors need to know that they will benefit from the change or they will have lower 
incentives to support it (Ostrom 2014). 
 
Collective action problems become most apparent at the complex nexuses that link policy 
areas, where the effects of one policy affect the outcomes of another. For example, arms sales 
may benefit the defence industry and the local economy in a stable Western country, but are 
unlikely to benefit the constituencies of that same country’s aid programme in a fragile 
developing country, namely the development policy community in the Western country and 
the recipient population in the fragile country (Hudson 2006). While improved coherence 
between defence industry policy and development policy may be possible through technical 
adjustments to the design and implementation of those respective policies, it is more likely 
that the core objectives of the two policies need to be identified and a decision taken as to 
which is more important. This requires a clear understanding of externalities and their 
impacts, and a hierarchy of goals in the context of the power relations between the two 
constituencies. Given that formal and informal rules governing policymaking and 
implementation are often shaped by interests that try to ensure that the rules serve to 
perpetuate them, changes require leadership and the legitimate regulatory authority to adjust 
the incentive structure for the actors concerned, or to force compliance.  
 
Coherence is not the natural state of affairs in bureaucratic political systems, whether a 
national administration or the EU-level. Different policy areas tend to be handled by 
bureaucratic actors that represent constituencies with different preferences for policy choices 
and outcomes. When the interests of the constituencies behind different policy areas clash, the 
bureaucratic actors mandated to design and implement policy find it difficult to act 
collectively. Ideally, the complementarity of policy orientations among different bureaucratic 
actors should be promoted top-down by a political strategy that defines priorities and common 
goals, and assigns responsibilities for addressing them. However, bureaucracies are not 
usually neutral political actors that simply implement directives from above, but tend to seek 
autonomy, leading to competition with other actors (Page 2012). The potential for 
bureaucracies to hinder the formulation of coherent policy responses has been emphasized in 
studies of ‘whole of government’ approaches, especially in response to security crises where 
effective engagement requires a combination of assets from defence, foreign affairs, and 
development bureaucracies (McConnell and Drennan 2006). Coherent cross-governmental 
action in these contexts requires clear overarching political guidance for engagement and 
3 Although the term ‘coherence’ is widely used, its meaning has remained ambiguous. It tends to be used 
interchangeably with other concepts such as ‘coordination’ or ‘consistency’. Coordination is an important pillar 
of coherence. While ‘consistency’ refers to the character of an outcome, ‘coherence’ goes further and specifies 
the quality of a process, in which entities join in a synergetic procedural whole that ‘structurally harmonises’ 
actions and actors (Gebhard 2011: 106).  
                                                        
incentives internal to bureaucracies for encouraging the promotion of goals and investing in 
coordination processes (OECD 2006). 
 
The promotion of policy coherence is, therefore, as much a political as it is a technical 
endeavour. Horizontal policy objectives do not always co-exist harmoniously but are often 
contested. Indeed, ‘coherence’ itself only makes sense with reference to the objectives that 
policies should be coherent with. Conceptualising policy coherence requires an understanding 
of goal hierarchies, while working towards more coherent policy requires trade-offs between 
objectives as incoherencies become apparent. Political constituencies with interests in 
particular outcomes are unlikely to accept unfavourable trade-offs easily, even when there is 
clear evidence of the negative effects of incoherence for others. The impact of institutional 
reforms on policy coherence is, therefore, likely to be marginal unless they are the result of a 
political decision to prioritise certain outcomes, reinforced by an adequate system of 
incentives that can induce actors to behave in a certain way. 
 
 
III. The Lisbon Treaty, collective action and coherence in EU foreign relations  
 
The EU has long linked collective action and coherence through the so called ‘triple C’ of 
coherence, coordination and complementarity (Picciotto 2005). Coordination, particularly at 
the EU-level, should lead to improved coherence, whereas complementarity has the potential 
to undermine coherence. This is because of the diversity inherent in the subsidiarity principle, 
whereby policymaking at the EU-level does not inhibit the member states’ bilateral 
prerogatives and international agreements (Craig 2012). Underwritten by the institutional 
autonomy of development policy at the EU level, the compartmentalisation of EU foreign 
relations among bureaucratic actors with differentiated but at times overlapping 
responsibilities became entrenched, for mostly intra-European reasons. The EU has tried to 
overcome this by engaging in strategic discourses on objectives to be achieved outside the 
Community method. EU strategic programmes have linked internal and external policies, such 
as the Lisbon Strategy and its successor Europe 2020. In foreign relations, the European 
Security Strategy (2003) and the European Consensus on Development (2006) aimed to 
provide clear directions enforced by soft instruments, such as voluntary harmonization and 
adjustment involving the concerned institutions and member states.  
 
Given that the EU has a long-standing formal commitment to PCD, development policy could 
serve as the primary reference for coherence in EU foreign relations (Egenhofer et al 2007). 
Ever since the 1957 Treaty of Rome, external trade was part of the EU’s common commercial 
policy and therefore the European Commission’s supranational competence. European 
Political Cooperation (EPC), which was formalised in the early 1970s and became part of the 
Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, Europeanised aspects of member states foreign and security 
policies, which nevertheless remained under intergovernmental modes of decision-making in 
the European Council. With the emergence of a sui generis relationship to former member 
state colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) in the 1970s, foreign relations 
were divided thematically and geographically between different Commission DGs and 
between the Commission itself and the Council Secretariat. Development policy was added to 
the 1992 Maastricht Treaty as a ‘shared competence’ between the Commission and member 
states, and PCD became part of the EU’s legal framework in article 178 of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and in article 3 TEU, which required consistency 
between all of the EU’s policies and its external activities. Politically, the EU commitment to 
PCD has developed further from the 1990s and was expressed in strategic policy declarations 
including the 2006 European Consensus on Development. These commitments also bound 
member states to the PCD agenda. In 2005 the EU established a PCD unit in DG 
Development, increased the use of inter-service consultations, and started work on a biennial 
PCD report (EC 2009).4 The PCD agenda was further strengthened at the level of strategic 
direction by the Lisbon Treaty.5 
 
The Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure that had hitherto put EU foreign relations into 
different ‘silos.’ The pillar system was regarded as a barrier to policy coherence, particularly 
in the realm of security policy where responses to multidimensional security threats 
demanded the availability of a range of instruments that could be mobilised in response 
(Deighton 2002). Symbolic of the end of the pillar system was the merging of the offices of 
CFSP High Representative with the External Relations commissioner into the HR/VP, and the 
establishment of the EEAS as an ‘interstitial organization’ hovering between classical 
diplomatic service and supranational Commission-bureaucracy (Bátora 2013). In 
organisational as well as institutional terms the ‘multi-hattedness’ of the HR/VP job 
description blurred the lines between supranational and intergovernmental competences as 
well as decision-making procedures. Following the Lisbon Treaty, the HR/VP conducts the 
CFSP, presides over the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) and – as first Vice-President of the 
Commission – coordinates external relations policies under Commission competence, 
including development, neighbourhood and trade (Erkelens and Blockmans 2012).  
 
The design of the EEAS is a prime example of attempting coherence through bureaucratic 
innovation. Its staff members have been drawn from three different parent institutions, 
including Commission officials from the former RELEX DGs, staff from the Council 
secretariat as well as member state officials seconded to the EEAS. The establishment of the 
EEAS meant reforms to the Commission’s external relations bureaucracy as well, most 
notably the integration of the ACP country desks into the EEAS and the merger of the former 
DG Development’s policy units with the EuropeAid agency to form DG Development and 
Cooperation (DEVCO). The process brought new expertise, including both diplomatic and 
development project management competence, to the EU and enhanced connections between 
EU and member foreign and development policy bureaucracies.  
 
The Lisbon Treaty also enhanced the decision-making and oversight role of the European 
Parliament in foreign relations. As Wisniewski (2013) has noted, the Parliament pushed hard 
for a greater foreign relations role and achieved more influence than the Lisbon Treaty 
intended. Although the Parliament has no role in the conclusion of agreements that relate 
exclusively to CFSP, the increasing practice of trialogues – involving the Commission, 
Council and member states – in legislative acts have made the Parliament an important 
interlocutor (Murdoch 2013). The Parliament also has increased authority over the CFSP and 
CSDP budgets, and holds debates on the two policies every six months. The Parliament 
receives regular visits and reports from the HR/VP. With regard to development policy, 
Article 209 TFEU requires that legislation necessary for development cooperation be adopted 
by both the Parliament and the Council, effectively placing both institutions on an equal 
footing. The Parliament exercised its powers in 2013 when the regulations governing the 
EU’s external financing instruments were negotiated in a strategic dialogue between the 
Parliament’s Development Committee and DEVCO. The Parliament does not control country-
4 Rather than assessing the EU’s performance on PCD, the reports have been used principally as a tool for 
communicating the agenda itself to member states and other partners, including the EU’s peers in the OECD-
DAC. 
5 Article 208 TFEU states that ‘The Union shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in the 
policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries.’ 
                                                        
level implementation, but can question the Commission if it considers that specific proposals 
promote causes other than development, such as European commercial or security interests. 
 
The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty coincided with the global financial crisis and the 
accompanying Euro crisis, a significantly tougher political and fiscal context than the boom 
years during which the Treaty was drafted and negotiated. Although economic crisis had little 
impact on the substance of EU foreign policy, it affected both strategic direction and 
collective action. Much of Europe’s attention was directed towards internal problems, in spite 
of momentous international events such as the 2011 Arab Spring and its aftermath. EU 
officials that took part in the post-Lisbon Treaty reforms lamented that the EEAS’ roll-out 
process was hampered by budget constraints at the very moment when expectations on 
Europe to act were highest (interview with EEAS official, Brussels June 2014). A European 
Court of Auditors investigation found that the establishment of the EEAS was ‘rushed and 
inadequately prepared, beset by too many constraints and vaguely defined tasks’ (European 
Court of Auditors 2014: 4). The report’s most important recommendations were to clarify the 
EEAS’ tasks and objectives and strengthen its capacity for strategy and planning. Although 
the Court of Auditors criticised the EEAS itself for not being proactive enough in prioritising 
strategic thinking, the lack of strategic guidance from member states in the European Council 
meant that there was a narrow political space for prioritising the many tasks that the EU was 
expected to perform and the division of labour between EU-level and member state foreign 
relations activities. 
 
The Juncker Commission, which took office in November 2014 with a new HR/VP, former 
Italian foreign minister Federica Mogherini, declared its intention to provide more strategic 
direction, partly by building on reforms made under Barroso and Ashton and partly by setting 
clearer priorities for EU foreign policy. In his mission letter to the incoming HR/VP, 
Commission President Juncker asked Mogherini, to ‘chair a Commissioners’ Group on 
External Action to develop a joint approach’ (Juncker 2014: 3f) and to move her headquarters 
from the EEAS building to the Commission building Berlaymont. This action seemed merely 
symbolic, and yet was clearly taken to improve collective action by reinforcing Mogherini’s 
VP function and thus linking the EEAS and the Commission more closely. The Juncker 
Commission’s intentions to improve policy coherence were also clear in its consultation paper 
for a comprehensive review to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2015, which 
devoted significant attention to ‘priorities’ and ‘focus’ (EC/EEAS 2015).  
 
 
IV. Coherence through collective action: managing the security-development nexus 
in EU foreign relations  
 
The nexus between EU security and development policies has long been recognised as beset 
by coherence problems (Hout 2010). Some difficulties have been attributed to collective 
action: Grimm (2014) argued that the EU’s complex institutional system impedes conceptual 
coherence with regard to fragile states policy. Different areas of the security-development 
nexus (particularly defence, civilian crisis response, humanitarian affairs and development) 
have been managed by actors with very different mandates and goals. Defence has remained a 
national concern despite efforts to increase EU-level cooperation as an alternative to NATO. 
Most EU member states still consider that defence assets should serve national interests 
(Biscop 2012). Development policy is a ‘mixed competence’ area where the Commission and 
member states have parallel, sometimes overlapping and sometimes even competing policy 
frameworks and country-level engagements. These are not always coherent with other aspects 
of foreign policy, both at EU and member state levels. While several EU member states have 
integrated development aid into their foreign ministries, in two (Germany and the UK) 
development ministries have had to manage contested turf, particularly in crisis response 
where mandates overlap with foreign ministries and other agencies. Humanitarian aid is 
managed at the EU-level by the Commission and in most member states, with the notable 
exception of the UK, by foreign ministries. It has remained a special area in which the tension 
between international neutrality principles and strategic policy processes for dealing with 
crises has long been noted (Macrae and Leader 2001). 
 
A number of strategies launched in the first decade of the 2000s established normative 
guidelines, although not strategic priorities, for improving coherence between EU security and 
development policy. The European Security Strategy (2003), the European Consensus on 
Development (2006) and the EU’s Communication on fragile states (2007) all called for EU-
level and member state actors to work more closely together in a ‘whole of EU approach’ to 
addressing global security and development challenges. In 2010 the EU decided to focus on 
five priority challenges for PCD, including strengthening the links and synergies between 
security and development in the context of a global peace building agenda. Subsequent efforts 
to improve collective action under the Lisbon Treaty have attempted to improve coherence at 
the nexus of security and development policies.  
 
Collective action among actors 
 
As described above, the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar system that had encouraged EU-
level actors to work in silos and it reformed the bureaucracy with the aim of improving 
collective action. The post-Lisbon Treaty reforms have led to increased cooperation among 
different services at the EU-level. One area of innovation has been the negotiation of new 
financing instruments, such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) where there 
has been greater attention to political and security issues; the Pan-African facility is a specific 
example of this (interview with EEAS official, June 2014). The civilian-military dimension 
has also been a core area for increased cooperation among EU diplomats, military staff and 
development cooperation officials in the context of certain missions and under the broader 
umbrella of the CSDP. Operations such as the EUFOR intervention in the Central African 
Republic have demonstrated the need for consolidation in the planning and execution of 
CSDP missions. Coordination in many cases has consisted of organising meetings and 
providing comments on proposals from other services. The EUFOR operation has been 
coordinated through weekly phone conferences, and civil-military coordination has also taken 
place at the field level, with ECHO’s field offices and OCHA playing an important role 
(interview with EEAS official, September 2014).  
 
Outside of the formal structures of inter-service consultations, some flexible working methods 
are emerging especially related to crisis response. The Crisis Management and Planning 
Directorate within the EEAS has started to coordinate EU-level responses to crises in specific 
country contexts, such as the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Nigeria, Syria 
and Libya. Although there is no template and all processes are shaped by the issue, the 
configuration of actors and the issues raised by the crisis, the EEAS calls the meetings and 
circulates the policy documents, often with ‘place holders’ for ECHO, DEVCO, NEAR or 
other services to include their competencies and perspectives. Officials in the responsible 
EEAS unit edit the draft and it goes to inter-service consultations, where any issues between 
the Commission, the EEAS and other services that have not been resolved at the working 
level are discussed. The final draft is then circulated among member states for comments and 
sign-off. The European Parliament has mostly been excluded from crisis response strategies, 
which have been considered CFSP and therefore European Council competence despite their 
increasing overlaps with community policy areas. 
 
Overcoming different institutional cultures and ways of thinking about problems has, 
nevertheless, not been easy. Most EEAS officials regard their organisation as a ministry of 
foreign affairs and defence, not foreign affairs and development. This helps with broadening 
perspectives by bringing foreign policy and defence perspectives into development 
discussions, but it does not imply more coherence. As one senior EEAS official noted, ‘the 
fact that we’re not the Commission creates tension: development versus foreign policy 
tension, but also institutional tension.’ Institutional tensions have their roots in the fact that 
the Commission remains responsible for most of the EU’s financial instruments, and the DGs 
with external budgets have looked to preserve their decision-making autonomy. As the EEAS 
official put it, ‘the Council PSC wants to tell DEVCO what to do, but they’re not the 
Commission. The PSC is comitology in the CFSP world, and for the IfS, but not for the EDF. 
This is a clash, we're solving it slowly, but it will create tension’ (interview, Brussels June 
2014). The EU’s legal framework has not evolved as fast as the policy and institutional 
frameworks. Another EEAS official noted that ‘more and more you don’t just have a CFSP 
process, but you also have the communitarian process. Competencies are clear, but we 
haven’t established a one-size-fits-all process. There is a gap between the Commission and 
the Council and we’re trying to bridge the gap with the EEAS’ (interview Brussels July 
2015). 
 
Efforts to improve collective action in civil protection have had an ambiguous impact on 
policy coherence, largely because of the strong desire of humanitarian aid agencies to protect 
the independence of their mandate. In the context of the reorganisation of the Commission, 
DG ECHO assumed responsibilities related to disaster preparedness inside and outside of the 
EU and therefore a coordination role with respect to aid for disaster relief. The increased 
emphasis on disaster resilience – which has a longer-term logic than humanitarian response – 
has implied closer work between DG DEVCO and DG ECHO, for example on the Horn of 
Africa and the Sahel where efforts to better combine development aid and humanitarian 
assistance have been prioritised. The position of ECHO within these discussions has been to 
try to avoid blurring the lines (especially military versus humanitarian) and to preserve the 
independence of humanitarian aid. The EEAS and ECHO have placed similar emphasis on 
crisis response, but ECHO officials have voiced a strong desire to keep humanitarian aid from 
becoming overly politicised, whereas EEAS officials see it as de facto and important political 
tool (interview with Commission official, Brussels June 2014). 
 
EU-level cooperation has not always been seamless. A recent study of the EU’s engagement 
with the Central African Republic since the Lisbon Treaty found that decision-making has 
remained compartmentalised rather than comprehensive (Orbie and Del Biondo 2015). In 
addition to the legal aspects, collective action at the EU level has had to cope with ‘pillar 
thinking’ that has prevailed despite the Lisbon Treaty’s abolition of the EU’s pillar structure. 
The Commission’s approach has continued to be more technocratic, where officials talk about 
instruments, the external dimension of internal policies, programming and budgets. EEAS 
officials want a more political, quid pro quo approach (interviews with EEAS and 
Commission officials, Brussels, June 2014 and July 2015). While the bureaucracies and their 
officials have become more socialised in different kinds of thinking, there have been many 
instances of misunderstanding between different organisational cultures. 
 
Policy coherence: the comprehensive approach 
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty the EU has stepped up its efforts to improve the coherence of its 
security and development policies. In spite of differing competencies and organisational 
cultures, there is widespread agreement on the necessity of a comprehensive approach to the 
security-development nexus across the Commission, the EEAS and the European parliament. 
In 2009, The Commission recognised that the EU’s security policymaking had side effects 
which impacted on developing countries (EC 2009). The European Council (2009) resolved to 
strengthen links and synergies between security and development in the context of a global 
peace building agenda, emphasizing strategic planning. The OECD-DAC praised the EU for 
its efforts to bring security policy into the PCD agenda, and called upon the EU to finish 
conceptual work on security, fragility and development “to ensure that European objectives 
for development co-operation, humanitarian assistance, and international security are 
mutually reinforcing” (2012: 15). The 2011 Agenda for Change called for the EU to ensure 
that its ‘objectives in the fields of development policy, peace-building, conflict prevention and 
international security are mutually reinforcing’, and that ‘the EU’s development, foreign and 
security policy initiatives should be linked so as to create a more coherent approach to peace, 
state-building, poverty reduction and the underlying causes of conflict’ (European 
Commission 2011: 6–11).  
 
Has the EU achieved this? The Barrosso Commission’s most important policy-level security-
development nexus initiatives that followed the Agenda for Change were the shelved action 
plan on security, fragility and development and the comprehensive approach to crisis response 
communication, which was published in December 2013. Two regional strategies, for the 
Horn of Africa and the Sahel, were also launched. Under the Juncker Commission the EEAS 
has developed comprehensive crisis response strategies for Syria and Iraq and for Libya. The 
common theme of all of these documents is their call for different EU-level agencies to work 
more closely together, and to combine the EU’s various policy tools in pursuit of specific sets 
of objectives.  
 
Work on the draft action plan on fragility started in 2010 based on experiences in six pilot 
countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Timor-Leste and Yemen. The plan 
was intended to clarify what role the EU level of Brussels institutions and EU delegations 
would have in relation to the EU’s member states, particularly those with large presences in 
fragile countries. Discussion among member state ministries, the Commission and the EEAS 
stalled in late 2010 after senior officials in DEVCO and the EEAS were reportedly reluctant 
to commit to the text and the political will to push it through dried up (interviews with EEAS 
and Commission officials, Brussels January 2013). Its shelving went mostly unnoticed outside 
expert circles (Görtz and Sherriff 2012). The fact that the action plan draft was not publicly 
released did not prevent the responsible units in the EEAS, DEVCO and the EU delegations 
from incorporating its most relevant and sensible provisions into policy and operations. 
Indeed, several issues that arose in the context of the action plan discussions remained in 
focus, as attention turned to the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to external conflict and crises. 
 
The comprehensive approach formulation process faced significant collective action 
challenges. Some member states felt that they no stake in EU-level discussions and could not 
formulate a common position. There was further resistance in parts of the Commission, 
because at the beginning the comprehensive approach processes was conducted by the EEAS 
in parallel to the fragility action plan and it was unclear what the relationship between the two 
processes was (interviews with EEAS and Commission officials, Brussels June 2014). The 
Communication was drafted using a combination of Community and intergovernmental 
methods, which officials involved in the process considered hard to reconcile (interview with 
EEAS official, January 2013). The exercise of formulating the policy document nevertheless 
brought people together from the military, security and development policymaking areas at 
the EU level who had hardly spoken in the past. Despite different backgrounds, one thing 
these officials had in common was crises response experience, and with this the realisation 
that the tools under their purview, whether military, civilian, technical or financial, were not 
on their own capable of resolving a crisis. 
 
The Council Conclusions on the Comprehensive Approach stressed collective action: ‘The 
EU’s policies and priorities should follow from common strategic objectives and a clear 
common vision of what the EU collectively wants to achieve in its external relations or in a 
particular conflict or crisis situation’ (European Council 2014: 2). As one Commission official 
put it, ‘we now have a good policy document that instructs member states, the EEAS and the 
Commission to work together, although it is still difficult to get the military and development 
people to work together’ (interview, Brussels June 2014). The Communication was written to 
reflect joined-up thinking, but existing structures were not efficient enough to promote this. 
The European Parliament was largely sidelined.6 Perhaps because the process was driven by 
the EEAS, the outcome was heavily shaped by the dynamics of crisis response rather than 
development, with the outcome that the development perspective was – at least rhetorically – 
subsumed by security concerns (Faria 2014). 
 
The comprehensive approach has been called into action under the Juncker Commission in the 
form of two crisis response strategies: the Syria-Iraq strategy and the Political Framework for 
a Crisis Approach (PFCA) for Libya, both formulated by the EEAS. The first PFCA, 
circulated in September 2014, was not tasked by the Council but emerged as an EEAS 
initiative. The process started with a meeting called by the EEAS with all interested services, 
including DG Home Affairs (for counter-terrorism and migration aspects), DEVCO, DG 
NEAR, and the EEAS mediation unit. There was also consultation with the sanctions and 
weapons proliferation colleagues in the EEAS and the EU Delegation to Libya (interview 
with EEAS official, July 2015). The European Parliament was not consulted as the PFCA is a 
restricted document to share with the member states. In April 2015 the EU Foreign Affairs 
Council asked HR/VP Mogherini to update the PFCA to focus on the way forward for Libya 
once a government of national unity was formed. The document called for things like stronger 
EU support for the UNSMIL mission and outlined the appropriate EU policy tools for 
engagement (EEAS 2015). 
 
The EU’s strategy for the Syria-Iraq crisis and the Islamist D’aesh threat was formulated in 
response to the events of the summer of 2014 and published in March 2015. As with the 
PFCA for Libya, the EEAS was in the lead for preparing the strategy. The Commission’s DG 
NEAR had a major role as well, particularly in bringing knowledge about processes and 
projects. Informal consultation with member states took place in December 2014 and EEAS 
officials included their initial concerns and recommendations before the document template 
was circulated at the EU level (interview with EEAS official, Brussels June 2015). The 
Communication posed three objectives: first, to ‘counter the threat posed by Da’esh and other 
terrorist groups to regional and international stability’; second to ‘create the conditions for and 
inclusive political transition in Syria’ and regional stability, and third to alleviate ‘the human 
suffering caused by the ongoing violence and displacement’ (EC/HRVP 2015: 6). From a 
PCD perspective the strategy appeared heavily securitized with its emphasis on ‘the D’aesh 
threat.’ It nevertheless represented a comprehensive effort to bring all of the EU’s tools to 
bear on a crisis situation, and was accompanied by the launch of a new instrument, the € 40 
million Madad trust fund for addressing the refugee crisis in Syria’s neighbours. 
6 The Parliament’s one success was in changing the name of the ‘Instrument for Stability’ to the ‘Instrument 
Contributing to Stability and Peace.’ 





Since the Lisbon Treaty there have been major efforts to address the security-development 
nexus both in actor and policy terms at the EU-level. Development and CFSP capacities have 
been brought together in the EEAS creating an ‘institutional’ locus that has helped reduce 
compartmentalisation. Policy coherence certainly gained a higher profile after the Lisbon 
Treaty. Collective action has started to result in more coherence, based not just on 
institutional reforms but on a (slowly) emerging set of norms regarding the most appropriate 
and effective role for the EU. There has been convergence at the level of discourse and 
rhetoric, towards a strategic culture of comprehensiveness in foreign relations, which has been 
reflected in the increasing number of joint actions and policy statements. The EU has been 
able to produce a comprehensive approach communication focussing on crisis response, and 
several crisis response strategies that outline the EU’s collective engagement in specific 
situations. Its failure to finalise the much more ambitious fragility action plan bringing 
together the entire peacekeeping, peacebuilding, statebuilding and development process 
indicates that policy coherence at the security-development nexus is still a work in progress. 
 
Systemic incoherencies, such as unclear or overlapping mandates, have only been partly 
resolved. There are still differences between the EEAS and the Commission with regard to 
engagement with crisis countries. DG DEVCO has maintained its emphasis on development 
priorities and its implementation practices have generally not changed. The EEAS has tried to 
take a more overtly political approach. Policymakers in the EU institutions have shown 
awareness of these problems and their potential impact on policy coherence, and have taken 
informal steps to work around some of the inconsistencies in the system. A good example of 
this is conflict analysis, where the EU had long professed to the principle of joint analysis but 
fell short on delivering. This has changed as conflict analysis has been conducted more 
regularly as a joint exercise involving member states, meaning that information has been 
shared. This has contributed in particular to joint programming, where conflict analyses have 
shaped division of labour at the country level (interview with Commission official, Brussels 
June 2014). 
 
Despite the institutional underpinnings of nexus management, the role of leadership is clearly 
important. As first HR/VP, Catherine Ashton not only had to build her service from scratch, 
she also had to deal with huge expectations. Her time in office was consequently perceived by 
many as failing to further collective action and policy coherence. She was side-lined by the 
Presidents of the Commission and the European Council on some issues, and her office was 
overwhelmed by the multitude of tasks it was assigned. As a result, Ashton focused on her 
role as an envoy and chief negotiator in key processes in EU foreign relations, such as the 
Iranian nuclear weapons talks, the Western Balkans peace process, and the Egyptian 
revolution and its aftermath. Her VP role as coordinator of other commissioners was mostly 
neglected. The Juncker Commission has taken steps to encourage the EU foreign 
policymaking system to function more collectively. HR/VP Mogherini has announced her 
intention to produce an overarching EU global strategy which is to set objectives for the 
various components of EU foreign relations. 
 
The EU is often considered to have a comparative advantage because of the range of policy 
instruments at its disposal, but at the same time a disadvantage because the many components 
that give it its wide range also make it very difficult to coordinate. This is only partly true. 
The EU does have a wider range of assets than many international actors, especially its array 
of civilian and financial policy tools and its global network of delegations. This certainly sets 
it apart from multilateral organisations and most small to middle-sized nation states, but not 
from large nations like the United States, China, or even more importantly its own member 
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